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A year ago, we presented a historical analysis 
comparing the run-up to the 2007 US subprime 
financial  crisis  with  the  antecedents  of  other 
banking  crises  in  advanced  economies  since 
World War II (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008a). We 
showed that standard indicators for the United 
States, such as asset price inflation, rising lever-
age,  large  sustained  current  account  deficits, 
and a slowing trajectory of economic growth, 
exhibited virtually all the signs of a country on 
the verge of a financial crisis—indeed, a severe 
one. In this paper, we engage in a similar com-
parative historical analysis that is focused on the 
aftermath of systemic banking crises.
In  our  earlier  analysis,  we  deliberately 
excluded  emerging  market  countries  from 
the  comparison  set,  in  order  not  to  appear 
to engage in hyperbole. After all, the United 
States is a highly sophisticated global financial 
center. What can advanced economies possibly 
have in common with emerging markets when 
it comes to banking crises? In fact, as Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008b) demonstrate, the anteced-
ents and aftermath of banking crises in rich 
countries  and  emerging  markets  have  a  sur-
prising amount in common. There are broadly 
similar patterns in housing and equity prices, 
unemployment,  government  revenues,  and 
debt. Furthermore, the frequency or incidence 
of crises does not differ much historically, even 
if comparisons are   limited to the post–World 
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War II period (  provided the   ongoing late-2000s 
global financial crisis is taken into account). 
Thus,  this  study  of  the  aftermath  of  severe 
financial  crises  includes  a  number  of  recent 
emerging market cases to expand the relevant 
set of comparators. Also included in the com-
parisons  are  two  prewar  developed  country 
episodes for which we have housing price and 
other relevant data.
Broadly  speaking,  financial  crises  are  pro-
tracted affairs. More often than not, the after-
math  of  severe  financial  crises  share  three 
characteristics.  First,  asset  market  collapses 
are  deep  and  prolonged.  Real  housing  price 
declines average 35 percent stretched over six 
years, while equity price collapses average 55 
percent over a downturn of about three and a 
half  years.  Second,  the  aftermath  of  banking 
crises is associated with profound declines in 
output  and  employment.  The  unemployment 
rate  rises  an  average  of  7  percentage  points 
over the down phase of the cycle, which lasts 
on average over four years. Output falls (from 
peak to trough) an average of over 9 percent, 
although the duration of the downturn, averag-
ing roughly two years, is considerably shorter 
than for unemployment. Third, the real value 
of government debt tends to explode, rising an 
average of 86 percent in the major post–World 
War II episodes. Interestingly, the main cause 
of debt explosions is not the widely cited costs 
of  bailing  out  and  recapitalizing  the  banking 
system. Admittedly, bailout costs are difficult 
to measure, and there is considerable divergence 
among estimates from competing studies. But 
even upper-bound estimates pale next to actual 
measured rises in public debt. In fact, the big 
drivers of debt increases are the inevitable col-
lapse in tax revenues that governments suffer in 
the wake of deep and prolonged output contrac-
tions, as well as often ambitious countercyclical 
fiscal policies in advanced economies aimed at 
mitigating the downturn.
†Discussants:  Pierre-Olivier  Gourinchas,  University 
of  California-Berkeley;  Andrew  Atkeson,  University  of 
California-Los Angeles; Joshua Aizenman, University of 
California-Santa Cruz.
* Reinhart:  School  of  Public  Policy  and  Department 
of  Economics,  4105  Van  Munching  Hall,  University  of 
Maryland,  College  Park,  MD  20742  (e-mail:  creinhar@
umd.edu);  Rogoff:  Economics  Department,  232  Littauer 
Center, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138–3001 
(e-mail: krogoff@harvard.edu). The authors would like to 
thank Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Vincent R. Reinhart 
for helpful comments.VOL. 99 NO. 2 467 ThE AFTERmATh OF FiNANciAL cRiSES
I.  The Historical Comparison Group
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) included all the 
major postwar banking crises in the developed 
world (a total of 18) and put particular emphasis 
on the ones dubbed “the big five” (Spain 1977, 
Norway 1987, Finland 1991, Sweden 1991, and 
Japan 1992). It is now beyond contention that the 
present US financial crisis is severe by any met-
ric. As a result, we now focus only on systemic 
financial crises, including the “big five” devel-
oped economy crises plus a number of famous 
emerging market episodes: the 1997–1998 Asian 
crisis (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand); Colombia 1998; 
and Argentina 2001. These are cases where we 
have all or most of the relevant data that allow 
for thorough comparisons. Central to the analy-
sis is historical housing price data, which can be 
difficult to obtain and are critical for assessing 
the present episode.
1 We also include two ear-
lier historical cases for which we have housing 
prices, Norway in 1899 and the United States in 
1929.
II.  The Downturn after the Crisis: 
A Comparison of Depth and Duration
Figure  1  looks  at  the  bust  phase  in  hous-
ing  price  cycles  surrounding  banking  crises, 
1 In Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), we look at financial 
crises  in  66  countries  over  200  years,  emphasizing  the 
broad parallels between emerging markets and developed 
countries, including, for example, the nearly universal run-
up in government debt. 
Figure 1. Past and Ongoing Real House Price Cycles and Banking Crises: 
Peak-to-Trough Price Declines (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) bank-
ing crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis 
episodes. For the ongoing episodes, the calculations are based on data through the following periods: October 2008, monthly, 
for Iceland and Ireland; 2007, annually, for Hungary; and 2008:III, quarterly, for all others. Consumer price indices are used 
to deflate nominal house prices.
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) and sources cited therein.
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  including  the  current  episode  in  the  United 
States  and  a  number  of  other  countries  now 
experiencing banking crises: Austria, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
Ongoing crises are in light shading; past crises 
are in dark shading. The cumulative decline in 
real housing prices from peak to trough aver-
ages 35.5 percent. 
2 The most severe real hous-
ing price declines were experienced by Finland, 
the  Philippines,  Colombia,  and  Hong  Kong. 
Their crashes were over 50 percent, measured 
from peak to trough. The housing price decline 
experienced by the United States to date during 
the current episode (almost 28 percent accord-
ing to the Case–Shiller index) is already more 
2 The historical average, which is shaded in black in the 
diagram, does not include the ongoing crises.
than twice that registered in the US during the 
Great Depression.
Notably, the duration of housing price declines 
is quite long-lived, averaging roughly six years. 
Even  excluding  the  extraordinary  experience 
of Japan (with its 17 consecutive years of price 
declines), the average remains over five years.
As  Figure  2  illustrates,  the  equity  price 
declines  that  accompany  banking  crises  are 
far steeper than are housing price declines, if 
somewhat shorter lived. The shorter duration of 
the downturn when compared with real estate 
prices  is  consistent  with  the  observation  that 
equity prices are far less inertial. The average 
historical decline in equity prices is 55.9 percent, 
with the downturn phase of the cycle lasting 3.4 
years. Notably, during the current cycle, Iceland 
and Austria have already experienced peak-to-
trough equity price declines far exceeding the 
average of the historical comparison group.
Figure 2. Past and Ongoing Real Equity Price Cycles and Banking Crises: 
Peak-to-Trough Price Declines (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) bank-
ing crisis episodes are included subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis 
episodes. For the ongoing episodes, the calculations are based on data through December 2, 2008. Consumer price indices 
are used to deflate nominal equity prices.
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) and sources cited therein.
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Figure 3 looks at increases in unemployment 
rates across the historical comparison group. (As 
the unemployment rate is classified as a lagging 
indicator, we do not include the current crisis.) 
On average, unemployment rises for almost five 
years,  with  an  increase  in  the  unemployment 
rate of about 7 percentage points. While none 
of the postwar episodes rivals the rise in unem-
ployment  of  over  20  percentage  points  expe-
rienced by the United States during the Great 
Depression,  the  employment  consequences  of 
financial crises are nevertheless strikingly large 
in many cases.
It is interesting to note in Figure 3 that when it 
comes to banking crises, the emerging markets, 
particularly those in Asia, seem to do better in 
terms of unemployment than do the advanced 
economies.  While  there  are  well-known  data 
issues in comparing unemployment rates across 
countries,
3 the relatively poor performance in 
advanced countries suggests the possibility that 
greater (downward) wage flexibility in emerg-
ing markets may help cushion employment dur-
ing  periods  of  severe  economic  distress.  The 
gaps in the social safety net in emerging market 
economies, when compared to industrial ones, 
presumably also make workers more anxious to 
avoid becoming unemployed.
3  Notably,  widespread  “underemployment”  in  many 
emerging markets is not captured in the official unemploy-
ment statistics.
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Figure 3. Past Unemployment Cycles and Banking Crises: Trough-to-Peak 
Percent Increase in the Unemployment Rate (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) bank-
ing crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis 
episodes.
Sources:  OECD,  IMF,  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States  (HSOUS),  various  country  sources,  and  authors’ 
calculations.mAY 2009 470 AEA PAPERS AND PROcEEDiNGS
Figure 4 looks at the cycles in real per capita 
GDP around banking crises. The average mag-
nitude  of  the  decline,  at  9.3  percent,  is  stun-
ning.  Admittedly,  for  the  post–World  War  II 
period, the declines in real GDP are smaller for 
advanced economies than for emerging market 
economies. A probable explanation for the more 
severe contractions in emerging market econo-
mies is that they are prone to abrupt reversals 
in the availability of foreign credit. When for-
eign capital comes to a “sudden stop,” to use the 
phrase coined by Guillermo Calvo, Alejandro 
Izquierdo,  and  Rudy  Loo-Kung  (2006),  eco-
nomic activity heads into a tailspin.
4
4 When no foreign financing is possible, emerging mar-
kets have seen consumption and investment implode during 
severe financial crises.
Compared to unemployment, the cycle from 
peak to trough in GDP is much shorter, only two 
years. Presumably, this is partly because poten-
tial GDP growth is positive, and we are measur-
ing only absolute changes in income, not gaps 
relative to potential output. Even so, the reces-
sions  surrounding  financial  crises  have  to  be 
considered unusually long compared to normal 
recessions that typically last less than a year.
5 
Indeed, multiyear recessions typically occur only 
in  economies  that  require  deep  restructuring, 
such as Britain in the 1970s (prior to Thatcher), 
Switzerland in the 1990s, and Japan post-1992 
(the last due not only to its financial collapse, but 
also to the need to reorient the economy in light 
5  See  International  Monetary  Fund  (2002,  chap.  3). 
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Figure 4. Past Real Per Capita GDP Cycles and Banking Crises: 
Peak-to-Trough Decline in Real GDP (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) bank-
ing crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis 
episodes. Total GDP, in millions of 1990 US$ (converted at Geary Khamis PPPs) divided by midyear population.
Sources: Total Economy Database (TED), Historical Statistics of the United States (HSOUS), and authors’ calculations.VOL. 99 NO. 2 471 ThE AFTERmATh OF FiNANciAL cRiSES
of China’s rise). Banking crises, of course, usu-
ally require painful restructuring of the finan-
cial system, and so are an important example of 
this general principle.
Figure 5 shows the rise in real government 
debt in the three years following a banking cri-
sis.  The  deterioration  in  government  finances 
is striking, with an average debt rise of over 86 
percent.  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2008b),  taking 
advantage  of  newly  unearthed  historical  data 
on domestic debt, show that this same buildup 
in government debt has been a defining char-
acteristic of the aftermath of banking crises for 
over a century. We look at percentage increase 
in debt, rather than debt-to-GDP, because some-
times  steep  output  drops  would  complicate 
interpretation of debt–GDP ratios. As Reinhart 
and  Rogoff  (2008b)  note,  the  characteristic, 
huge  buildups  in  government  debt  are  driven 
mainly by sharp falloffs in tax revenue and, in 
many cases, big surges in government spend-
ing to fight the recession. The much ballyhooed 
bank bailout costs are, in several cases, only a 
  relatively  minor  contributor  to  post–financial 
crisis debt burdens.
III.  Concluding Remarks
An examination of the aftermath of severe 
financial crises shows deep and lasting effects 
on  asset  prices,  output,  and  employment. 
Unemployment rises and housing price declines 
extend out for five and six years, respectively. 
On the encouraging side, output declines last 
only  two  years  on  average.  Even  recessions 
sparked by financial crises do eventually end, 
albeit almost invariably accompanied by mas-
sive increases in government debt.
How relevant are historical benchmarks for 
assessing  the  trajectory  of  the  current  global 
financial crisis? On the one hand, the authori-
ties today have arguably more flexible monetary 
policy frameworks, thanks particularly to a less 
rigid global exchange rate regime. Some central 
banks have already shown an aggressiveness to 
act that was notably absent in the 1930s, or in 
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Figure 5. Cumulative Increase in Real Public Debt in the Three Years Following the Banking Crisis
Notes: Each banking crisis episode is identified by country and the beginning year of the crisis. Only major (systemic) bank-
ing crisis episodes are included, subject to data limitations. The historical average reported does not include ongoing crisis 
episodes, which are omitted altogether, as these crises begin in 2007 or later, and debt stock comparison here is with three 
years after the beginning of the banking crisis.
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the latter-day Japanese experience. On the other 
hand, one would be wise not to push too far the 
conceit that we are smarter than our predeces-
sors. A few years back many people would have 
said that improvements in financial engineering 
had done much to tame the business cycle and 
limit the risk of financial contagion.
Since  the  onset  of  the  current  crisis,  asset 
prices have tumbled in the United States and 
elsewhere  along  the  tracks  laid  down  by  his-
torical precedent. The analysis of the post-cri-
sis outcomes in this paper for unemployment, 
output, and government debt provide sobering 
benchmark numbers for how the crisis will con-
tinue to unfold. Indeed, these historical com-
parisons were based on episodes that, with the 
notable  exception  of  the  Great  Depression  in 
the United States, were individual or regional 
in nature. The global nature of the crisis will 
make it far more difficult for many countries to 
grow their way out through higher exports, or to 
smooth the consumption effects through foreign 
borrowing.  In  such  circumstances,  the  recent 
lull in sovereign defaults is likely to come to an 
end. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) highlight, 
defaults in emerging market economies tend to 
rise sharply when many countries are simulta-
neously experiencing domestic banking crises.
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